INTRODUCTION
This paper deals with certain externalities which a cooperative organisation imposes on its members. These externalities arise when the cooperative acts as an association of individuals seeking to further their individual interests rather than to achieve a common goal (Cf. Zusman, 1983) . Specifically, the present study analyses the economic implications of mutual liability for debts as practiced in Israel's moshavim.
The moshav (singular of moshavim) is a semi-cooperative village consisting of about 70 small family farms, each endowed with an equal land allotment averaging about 10 acres. The m oshav's members farm individually, but market their produce collectively. The value of a mem ber's collectively marketed produce is entered as a credit in the cooperative's account, which can be used by the member for purchasing inputs and consumer goods. The cooperative in the moshav also acts as an intermediary between the members and financial institutions. In doing so, it maintains the principle of mutual responsibility for members' debts through mutual co-signing. Indeed, where institutional arrangements limit the use of land as collateral, credit sharing may be essential in making loans available to small farmers. In any event, financial cooperation can exploit economics of scale and risk-sharing to lower the cost of credit for cooperative members and reduce their administrative costs. (Zusman, 1988) . However, financial cooperation may also lead to a 'free-rider' problem characteristic of price pooling: if debt behaviour is uncoordinated and the individual farm units are sufficiently small in size and large in number, farmers will not take into account the effect of their accumulated debt on the terms of credit and resale value of their farms. Consequently, they may leverage their farms more than is optimal.
Since 1921 more than 300 moshavim have been established. In the early stages of Israel's development they played a critical role in providing agricultural goods for the general population; in establishing sovereignty over the country's peripheral regions; and in absorbing many of the immigrants who came as refugees after the establishment of the state of Israel. In those pioneer years the cooperative organisation of the moshav carried substantial benefits for small farmholders, allowing them to exploit opportunities for scale economics by sharing agricultural equipment; through collective purchasing and marketing; and in credit sharing.
Moreover, the implicit and mutual undertaking of moshav members to help each other in difficult times proved invaluable in the early years, allowing many of the moshavim to grow and prosper while maintaining an egalitarian framework.
Economic studies on the moshav have em phasised the aspects of cooperation, capitalisation, efficiency of production and equity. Haruvi and Kislev (1984) suggested that factors such as value of time and credit availability imply a reciprocal interaction between the level of capitalisation of the individual farm and the moshav's level of collective marketing. A possible result of such interaction is a polarisation of moshavim with regard to economic performances. Using mid 1970s data on moshavim Sadan and W eintraub (1980) found that personal characteristics such as experience, schooling and cultural background are significant factors in determining farm income in moshavim. The management quality of farmers in moshavim was found to be a significant factor in Just, Zilberman and Hochman's (1983) micro study on multicrop production functions in two moshavim in the 1970s. Nevertheless, Berck and Levy (1984) ; who simulated the consequences of different patterns of land allocation with a simultaneous equation system of production and labour supply estimated with the same mid 1970s data used by Sadan and Weintraub (1980) ; concluded that the costs, in terms of income inequality of allocating land according to efficiency criteria is high, while the gains, in terms of value added, are modest.
During the 1980s, however, many of the less established moshavim have had severe financial difficulties and sunk into large debts. This is reflected in Table 1 below which describes the distribution and composition of debt and real interest rates paid on short-term liabilities in two moshavim which have given us direct access to their ledgers. The very high real interest rates and the large shares of short-term liabilities raise doubts about the ability of these semi-cooperative villages to withstand the financial crisis they are experiencing. There are exogenous reasons for these difficulties: government cuts in subsidies and support for the agricultural sector; a decline in the profitability of exports due to adverse changes in international exchange rates and delayed and insufficient depreciation of the Israeli currency; uncertainty and confusion which arise from Israel's very high and accelerating rate of inflation which lead to high real interest rates.
But there are possibly significant endogenous reasons too: inefficient management, unduly large allocation of resources to consumption and residential investment, and the 'free rider' problem that arose from inadequate accounting systems. The very large debts that have resulted from these various factors have become the predominant problem of these semi cooperative villages and raise doubts regarding the suitability of their organisational structure in present conditions. The present study attempts to explore the long-run consequences of the farm own debt and the m oshav's average debt on farm household investment in productive capital stock and consumption. In particular, the analysis focuses on financial externalities that may arise from the moshav's organisational principles of mutual responsibility. As we shall show, these can have considerable adverse effects on the capital investment and borrowing of the more efficient farms, relative to less efficient farms, especially in periods of recession when the financial position of the moshav is worsened. These effects are studied in section II within the framework of an optimal control model and summarised by a number of optimality conditions. 
II MODEL
This section presents a simple formulation of the economic behaviour of a family farm in a moshav. The framework is dynamic and takes into account the unique and essential relationships between the single unit and the moshav organisation as regards the principles of mutual responsibility for members' debts, and sharing of collective marketing and financial services provided by a purchasing organisation. A purchasing organisation is common to a number of nearby moshavim typically affiliated to the same ideological movement. In addition to purchasing agricultural products, it provides banking services to the moshavim and plays an important role in Israel's so called "gray credit market". Single farms do not have direct access to the purchasing organisation. They settle their business affairs with the moshav's secretary and accounting offices. These authorised offices deal with the purchasing organisation. Hence, the farm 's debt is to the moshav, and the moshav's debt is to the purchasing organisation.
The economic environment of the family farm can be characterised by the motion equations that describe the evolution of its stock of productive capital and debt: In this framework, the implications of the moshav's financial structure, and particularly that debts are mutually secured by all members of the moshav, is that the interest rate paid by the individual farm is that which is set by the purchasing organisation for the moshav as a whole, and is thus a function of the moshav's average debt:
Assuming the farm er's temporal utility can be represented as an increasing, convex function of current consumption, u(C), and that lim u'(C) = 0, we now postulate the C -»°°f arm er's decision problem as choosing consumption, investment and on farm labour2 over a known finite horizon (0, T) so as to maximise the value of the discounted utility stream and the "salvage value" S(T) measured in utilities and associated with the assets of the farm at the and the m oshav's average debt (AD). Both have a negative effect on the farm 's resale value, the latter because of the mutual responsibility for debts and the effect of the moshav's average debt on its cooperative reputation. We therefore specify the farm 's salvage value as follows
where R is a function which translates K (measured as accumulated net investments, at constant prices) to its resale value in utiles. It is assumed that R represents the moshav's reputation and hence decreases with A D j. M denotes the loss of utility due to the member's liability for his own and the moshav's debt. Because of the mutual co-signing principle, M is assumed to increase with the farm 's own debt and the m oshav's average debt. Summing up, we assume
The Hamiltonian for the problem specified in (4) is
The variables K, D, N, C, I, and %2 must obey the constraints and the auxiliary equations
the optimality conditions for interior solution (i.e., assuming that control constraints are not binding)
and the transversality conditions
It is important to note that in the derivation of the auxiliary equation (7b) we assume that the single farm considers its effect on the moshav's average debt to be negligible, i.e., 3AD/9D = 0. The assumption reflects the 'free-rider' problem characteristic of price pooling. In support of this assumption we mention that a typical moshav consists of about seventy small farms endowed with equal size of land (ten acres) and water allotments.
It is also important to note that the path of AD is only known ex post. Thus, the above analysis should be viewed as adopting the common practice to rely on what is called certainty equivalence. This procedure takes the solution to the certainty model and replaces the unknown AD with their conditional expected value given the information available. My impression from working with several of the financially distressed moshavim is that due to an inefficient accounting system the information available to a moshav's member is on the values of AD and D a year ago (AD_i and D .i); and that due to a severe lack o f coordination of and information about the allocation of credit, there was a common belief among the moshav's members that the discrepancy between AD and AD"i is nothing but a white noise. Conversely, the empirical analyses in section IV will consider the one-year lages of the state variables as explanatories.
III MODEL'S IMPLICATIONS
In this section we present the model's implications as regards the members' debts, capital stocks and consumption.
A.
Effect o f the Moshav Average Debt on the Member's Debt
From the optimality conditions (8b) and (8c) kl(t) = -X2(t).
This result and the transversality conditions imply that for K(T) > 0
Given the expected ADt , the member's terminal own debt can be found from (11). 
B . Effect o f the Moshav's Average Debt on Capital Stock
The transversality condition (9a) implies that for K(T) > 0 
In this context, the ratio of value added to capital (V/K) can be viewed as a measure of farm efficiency. Thus, whatever the direction of the debt, less efficient farms may be expected to respond to changes in the current average debt of the moshav by changing their current productive capital stock at a faster rate than more efficient farms.
C. Effect o f the Moshav's Average Debt on Consumption
By differentiating both sides of the optimality condition (8b) with respect to t we obtain re'rt U c -e_rt U ccC + = 0 © and substituting (7a) and (8b) for and Xi (20) [r + 5-VK (K, N)] UC -UccC = 0. The underlying reason is that the more myopic the member (i.e., the larger r) and the lower the costs of credit, the more will be consumed today and the less in future periods. Since the cost of credit is increasing in AD, the cooperative organisation of the moshav encourages consumption in earlier periods by those members whose debts are greater than the average, visa-vis private farming.
IV EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
The empirical analysis presented in this section comprises two parts. The first part (A)
tests whether an increase in the m oshav's average debt acts to reduce the stock of productive capital, and whether less efficient farms change their capital stock at a faster rate than more With these pooled cross-section observations we continue our analysis from section IIIB by testing whether an increase in the m oshav's average debt reduces or increases the individual farm's productive capital stock, and whether the rate of change varies with the farm's level of efficiency. We conduct this test within the framework of equation (19) and subject to the simplifying assumption that i"(AD) = 0. We also take into account possible variation among the family farms through the inclusion of available characteristics such as farm age The significant negative coefficient associated with (V/K)t ^ (ADt -ADt-i) indicates that an increase in the moshav's average debt acts to reduce the stock of productive capital, and that less efficient farms do indeed change their capital stock at a faster rate than more efficient farms.
The negative and significant estimate associated with FAGE indicates that, ceteris paribus, newer farms invest more. Since in the Israeli moshavim farm age and farmer age are positively and highly correlated, this result can be further reasoned by life-cycle arguments.
The effect of family size on farm investment may be viewed as the discrepancy between two opposing effects. On the one hand, a larger family, ceteris paribus, may have a larger labour force and hence a greater income. On the other hand, a large family spends much on consumption. As the estimate associated with SIZE is not significantly different from zero this may indicate that these effects offset one another. The nativity variable proxies cultural and educational differences between the more westernised Israeli bom farmers and the immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa. The estimation results show that the effect of these differences on investment are insignificant.
Many of the m oshavim 's members also work off the farm. High skill off-farm employment can successfully compete with income from farming and hence may reduce investment. The estimation result, however, indicates that, ceteris paribus, the rate of capital accumulation is insignificantly affected by off-farm employment.
B Estimation o f the Investment-Borrowing Behaviour with Aggregate Data on 82 Moshavim
The set of the first-order conditions for maximum utility presented in the previous section constitutes a simultaneous equation system in which the control variable I (net t-ratios (in parentheses) are presented in Table 2 and Table 3 below. While Table 2 indicates only the direct effects o f the exogenous variables, D-i, K_i, RIBF, AGE and MDCR-i on the representative member's current investment and borrowing, the estimated parameters in Table 3 also include the indirect effects and hence exhibit the full effects of the independent variables on the representative member's investment and borrowing. The age variable is excluded from the borrowing equation by the estimation program due to low level of tolerance. Therefore, and in order to obtain identification, this variable is also excluded from the borrowing equation in the three-stage least squares estimation. Furthermore, best estimation results of the structural parameters are obtained when RIBF is omitted from the investment equation.
The estimates in Table 2 and Table 3 indicate that: 1. Investment and borrowing are mutually dependent -the availability of credit increases investment, which in turn increases borrowing. The former effect is statistically insignificant whereas the latter is significant.
2.
The direct and full effects of the representative m em ber's debt on his levels of investment are positive but statistically insignificant, whereas the direct and full effects of the representative member's debt on his borrowing are both negative and statistically significant. The full effect of the representative m em ber's debt on borrowing is moderated by the positive direct effect of the debt on investment, which is transmitted through the positive direct effect of investment on borrowing. These results indicate that in view of their relatively large debts and the high interest rates farmers reduce their current borrowing but not necessarily at the expense of investment in production capital.
3.
As can be reasoned by a diminishing marginal product's argument, the direct and full effects of the representative farm er's capital stock on net investment are negative and statistically significant. In contrast, the direct and indirect effects of the representative farm 's capital stock on borrowing are positive and statistically significant. A possible explanation is that a larger stock of capital may be associated with a larger production activity which necessitates a larger credit for buying perishable inputs. Note that the full effect of the capital stock on borrowing is moderated by a negative indirect effect which stems from the negative effect of capital stock on investment and the positive effect of investment on borrowing. punitive, it will discourage debt accumulation.
1.
A similar relationship between the interest rate and debt was also assumed by Hochman, Hochman and Razin (1973) . For further discussion of the financial aspects in moshavim see Haruvi and Kislev (1984) who specified the interest rate as a function of both borrowing and the m oshav's cooperative revenue. For simplicity and as our empirical analysis focuses on moshavim that borrow much more than they earn, we choose to neglect the latter factor.
2.
The allocation of time between leisure and labour is disregarded. It is assumed, for simplicity, that a fixed proportion of the time is devoted to work. 
